UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON
KINCAID HALL FIRE
ROOM 508, 508A
MARCH 24, 1997
Report by:
Mark D. Murray, PE
Fire Safety Manager
Environmental Health & Safety
University of Washington
Jerry Glines
Fire Safety Specialist
Environmental Health & Safety
University of Washington
April 10, 1997
On March 24, 1997, at approximately 7:00 p.m. a fire originated in Kincaid Hall room 508A (zoology laboratory), apparently from a hot plate. The fire grew and spread to room 508 and completely destroyed both rooms. Smoke, heat, and water damaged the balance of the fifth floor and limited areas of the fourth and sixth floors. The fire was extinguished by the Seattle Fire Department (SFD) using a single 2½ inch fire hose.
Total loss and disruption to business is unknown at this time but the entire fifth floor cannot be occupied until repaired. Response by the SFD and University Service Units was exceptional.
Fire sprinklers and a new fire alarm system should be considered to improve fire safety in this building.
On March 24, 1997, at approximately 7:00 p.m., a fire occurred in Room 508A of Kincaid Hall. It appears an unattended hot plate ignited methyl paraben, which spread to adjacent combustible materials including plastic cups and lids stored on shelving above the work bench.
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| Ceiling of room 508A |
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According to the Seattle Fire Department's Fire Investigation Unit, the fire then grew and spread through the ceiling space and a transfer grill in the door to the adjacent room (508). In a short time both rooms were fully involved in the fire. At 7:16 p.m. an area smoke detector in the penthouse mechanical room activated the building's fire alarm system and alerted the University of Washington Police Department. Washington Alarm Service, a contracted central monitoring station, also received the alarm.
First on the scene was a UWPD Officer who found smoke in the building. The Officer had been dispatched by the UWPD's communication center following receipt of the automatic fire alarm in Kincaid Hall. At about the same time a building occupant noticed smoke in the building, notified the UWPD by phone, and evacuated. Seattle Fire Department's first engine was dispatched from Station 17 (11th Avenue NE and NE 50th Street), by Washington Alarm Service at 7:17 p.m. and arrived approximately three minutes later. While SFD's first engine was in en route, the fire was upgraded to a full alarm after being notified, via radio, by the UWPD that smoke was present on the 5th floor. Also responding to the scene were the Facility Operations Maintenance Specialists (FOMS, a.k.a. Unit 2) from the University of Washington's Facility Services Operation.
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| Wood desk in room 508 |
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The Battalion Six Chief arrived shortly thereafter and noticed colored flames and other indications that hazardous materials could be involved. This resulted in a Hazardous Material Response by the SFD. Later, a Deputy Chief arrived to manage the incident for the SFD.
The fire department set up a command post at the south end of the building and used the standpipe in the south stair to bring water to the fire floor. Concurrently, fire fighters searched the building to confirm all occupants had evacuated. The UWPD manned all building entrances to prevent reentry by unauthorized personnel. The Seattle Fire Department obtained building keys from UWPD for the floor and room involved.
Fire fighters noted a limited amount of smoke present in the corridor of the fifth floor and smoke escaping beneath the corridor door of room 508. First observations from SFD noted the fire to be completely contained within rooms 508 and 508A with most of the fire in room 508A. Limited visibility from smoke, storage in the corridor, locked access, and the high audibility of the fire alarm horns (making communication difficult) delayed attempts in suppressing the fire from within the building.
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| Computer in room 508 |
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The fire had apparently vented through the exterior window before fire fighting operations could begin. The fire later vented through another window of room 508. SFD extended a fire hose from the South stair standpipe to room 508. A significant amount of heat and smoke was released into the corridor when the door to the corridor was opened for fire fighting.
The fire was soon extinguished as fire fighters on the floor below moved equipment and draped plastic to prevent water damage. Controlling spot fires, clean up, and decontamination followed.
To assist the SFD in the decontamination of fire fighters, Environmental Health & Safety (EH&S), transmitted a hazardous material inventory and material safety data sheets for room 508 to the UWPD from the University Lab Safety System using electronic mail from home at about 7:30 p.m.
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| File cabinets in room 508 |
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The SFD later requested inventories for the entire fifth floor which EH&S had printed at the Academic Computing Center (ACC) building. The complete detailed inventories sorted by hazard class could not be transmitted via E-mail so EH&S personnel went to the University at about 8:30 p.m. and hand delivered them to the incident commander of the SFD.
SFD asked EH&S to assist in establishing an appropriate decontamination protocol based upon the chemicals encountered in the lab. EH&S also provided assistance to the SFD in determining what areas of the building should be closed to public access. Additional support was provided by EH&S staff to locate a water extraction contractor to come immediately and begin work.
The Seattle Fire Department Fire Investigations Unit has ruled this fire as accidental. A specific cause has not been confirmed but an unattended hot plate used for heating a solution in room 508A is suspected.
A graduate student indicated that he was working with a hot plate melting methyl-paraben in a Pyrex container in room 508A in the late afternoon of March 24. He may have unintentionally left the hot plate on as he left for the day at approximately 5:30 p.m. The student shut and locked the door to room 508 as he left the building.
A full report by the Seattle Fire Department Fire Investigations Unit will be made available within a few weeks.
Kincaid Hall was constructed in 1971 and has had little renovation since then. Floors and exterior walls are constructed of reinforced concrete. The exterior has a brick facade. Two reinforced concrete stair towers extend to all occupied levels. Floor-to-floor fire resistance is 2-hours. Interior walls are constructed of sheet rock on metal studs with full height brick cladding over some corridor walls. Corridor walls are substantially fire resistant with full height sheet rock on metal stud partitions and 1-3/4 inch thick solid core wood doors, unlabeled and without smoke gaskets or door closers, but otherwise equivalent to current construction standards. A mineral fiber suspended acoustical ceiling is provided in most areas. A dry standpipe exists at the south stair. No fire sprinkler system exists except in the below grade levels, the basement and subbasement. A limited fire alarm system exists that includes horns, pull stations, a few smoke detectors, and a waterflow switch for the basement sprinkler system. The system is monitored by Washington Alarm Service and the UWPD.
Rooms 508, 508A, 508B and 508C totaling 828 square feet are assigned to a professor who has been researching butterflies. The space was occupied as a typical research lab with laboratory benches, desks, file cabinets, a fume hood, and various laboratory equipment. Utilities included natural gas and other common lab services. The space also included two accessory offices, rooms 508B, and 508C. Very few hazardous materials were used in the laboratory.
Support by University Service Units to the SFD was deemed exceptional by the SFD Chief who indicated that the FOMS, Physical Plant Staff, and the UWPD were very helpful in providing information, shutting down utilities, assisting with access, and providing security. Hazardous material information provided by EH&S also proved valuable. Efforts by UWPD to keep media and the public away from the scene was complicated by the limited number of staff on shift, since the incident occurred after normal business hours.
The building performed rather well considering the nature and duration of this fire. Temperatures at the ceilings of room 508 and 508A reached up to 1100 to 1800 degrees Fahrenheit according to SFD Fire Investigations Unit. Fire and heat were contained within the room up until the point when fire fighters opened the door for suppression. Heat was released into the corridor when fire suppression began and resulted in significant smoke damage to the fifth floor common space. The solid core doors between room 508 and 508B, which remained closed until the fire was controlled, indicates how well 1¾ inch solid core doors perform. The doors were charred more than half way through, but they did not fail. Door frames also faired well because the were of metal construction and fully grouted. The reinforced concrete construction also did very well with no damage to the structure. A steel or wooden building would likely have been damaged structurally by a fire of this intensity. Sheet rock corridor walls penetrated by duct work, pipe and other systems performed well and remained intact as intended by the codes. All wall penetrations appeared to be well sealed.
SFD's response to this fire was organized, prompt and appropriate. Particularly noteworthy was the effort SFD made to control water damage on the fourth floors by moving equipment and providing plastic to cover building contents.
Rooms 508 and 508A totaling 634 square feet were totally destroyed by fire. Books, papers, computers, equipment, casework, shelving, a desk, the acoustical ceiling and other combustible materials were largely consumed. Solid core wood doors of rooms 508, 508B, and 508C were heavily charred. The fifth floor common space, totaling 1984 square feet was severely damaged by heat and smoke. Sheetrock, brick and tile interior walls and corridor doors were heavily charred and covered with soot from the ceiling down halfway to the floor. The ceiling system, light fixtures and other fixtures were heat damaged and covered with soot.
The balance of the floor, 6010 square feet, was contaminated with smoke and soot, the major exception were the environmental rooms which, due to their gaskets and seals, received little or no contamination. Soot reached nearly all areas of the fifth floor. (See attached floor plan). Smoke and soot damage from unburned fuel, some of which were petroleum based products (floor tile, Formica, and other building and equipment plastics) is extensive.
The fourth floor received substantial water damage, partly from fire suppression and partly due to a broken pipe that could not easily be isolated. Access was not allowed by the SFD following suppression, which took approximately 20 minutes, because the area was considered a potential crime scene. Shutting off the entire domestic service to the building was discouraged because it provide cooling water for ventilation system serving animal areas. After approximately three hours the building's domestic service was shut off. Service was restored the next morning following the SFD's investigation. The ceiling below the fire area was destroyed by water damage. Some furnishings were also damaged from water.
Prompt action by the SFD on the fourth floor (moving equipment and covering with plastic) saved a significant amount of equipment and materials. The fourth floor also received limited smoke contamination.
The sixth floor, mechanical space, and animal areas, received limited smoke contamination. Smoke traveled up the elevator shaft depositing soot and discoloring the walls near the elevator.
Three windows in the fire area were destroyed and the brick facade on the east side of the building was coated with soot and discolored by the fire. (See cover photo). Engineering Services reported that while the fire resulted in little structural damage to the building, the window lintel and brick around the window may have been damaged.
The entire fifth floor cannot be occupied as a result of the fire and is secured from access for an unknown duration (weeks to months). The researchers from the fifth floor were allowed to collect important materials from their labs but otherwise could not reoccupy them. Only environmental chambers remain in use, however.
Virtually all contents on the fifth floor will need to be cleaned and de-ionized, and removed so that contractors may begin cleaning and repair of the building. Electronic equipment will also need to be cleaned for salvage. Some equipment and materials may not be salvageable. It will likely be several months before the space is reoccupied.
Researchers on the fourth floor were disrupted but able to continue work following extensive cleaning and drying efforts that occurred for several days.
Facilities Services estimates the cost for demolition, repair, cleaning, de-ionization of salvageable equipment to be $700,000 to $900,000. This estimate, however, does not include cost for replacing unsalvageable equipment, loss of research, and loss of use. This estimate is much higher than the early reports by the SFD and media.
Prompt action by a contracted service, Superior Fire and Restoration, to remove water the night of the fire, and to dehumidify the space the next day, significantly reduced damage to building and contents. Mold and fungal growth are not expected to be an issue in otherwise salvageable areas.
Smoke contamination was relatively limited (one floor) due in part to the nature of the non-recirculating ventilation system, which is common to research buildings.
Full-height well-maintained fire walls are credited with containing the fire within rooms 508 and 508A. The wall separating 508 and 508A extended only to the acoustical ceiling which is code conforming and expected, but demonstrates how ineffective partial height walls are in containing fire to the room of origin. Adequately maintained fire walls, not compromised by unsealed through-wall penetrations, and closed doors were instrumental in containing the fire to the area of origin.
The Seattle Fire Department was familiar with the nature of the occupancy of this building prior to the fire. The SFD Chief was aware that hazardous materials would be present, but also knew that quantities were rather limited. If this had been a building in the Health Sciences or another building with a more moderate chemical loading, the SFD's tactics may have been very different. For example, if more chemicals had been present, fire fighting may not have been initiated until a full inventory of hazardous materials was made available. And depending upon the inventory, a much more conservative approach may have been taken, possibly fighting the fire externally, or not at all.
Of interest in this incident was the need for use of a network database, the Laboratory Safety System (LSS) for chemical inventories and the associated MSDS's. EH&S was asked to supply the MSDS's for the lab that was on fire and chemical inventories for all labs on the floor. MSDS's were transmitted immediately to the police via modem. With chemical inventories online and linked to hazard codes in LSS, it was easy for EH&S to begin compiling inventory hazard summaries. These summaries were delivered to the fire department on scene. The fire department was concerned about the risks to the firefighters exposed to chemicals, proper decontamination after exposure to chemicals, and the overall hazards/risks of nearby labs, hazardous material storage areas, equipment and processes elsewhere in the building.
Another interesting point--because all doors to the lab were closed, this fire was well contained, saving valuable research papers and data stored in a connecting office.